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Introduction
Stagflation may be defined as a condition of simultaneous price inflation and unemployment (McConnell, 1978) . Since the 1970s oil shocks, there has been a strong belief that energy crises are the most important element that accelerate and intensify the tendency towards stagflation (Branson and Rotemberg 1979; Bruno and Sachs 1985; Blinder and Rudd 2008; Burbige and Harrison 1984; Harkness 1982; Malinvaud 1977; Hill 1980; Leduc and Sill 2004; Mork Olsen and Mysen 1994; Peterson 1980) . 1 Consequently, not very much work have been done to examine other possible sources of stagflation. The exceptions are Gilbert and Hendryson (1975) , Barsky and Kilian (2002) , and Kilian (2010) . While Gilbert and Hendryson (1975) identify overtaxation as the cause of stagflation, Barsky and Kilian (2002) and Kilian (2010) emphasized monetary conditions as the cause of stagflation. With the recent trade policy shift in the US reigniting interest about the impact of protectionist-leaning trade policies on inflation, output, and unemployment, the objective of this paper is to examine whether tariffs could generate stagflationary tendencies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion on modeling the macroeconomic effects of import tariffs. Section 3 lays out the empirical model. Section 4 operationalizes the empirical model using quarterly data on the US economy from 1989-2017. A discussion of the results is also contained in Section 4. The paper ends with few concluding remarks in Section 5. *Department of Economics and Business Administration, Austin College, Sherman, TX. Email: mmohammed@austincollege.edu 2
Modeling the macroeconomic effects of tariffs
Tariff is tax levied on imported goods. It can be specific tariff when placed on each unit of imported good or ad valorem tariff when calculated as a percentage of the value of the imported good. Tariff, whether specific or ad valorem, increases the price of the imported good. A question of principal interest in this paper relates to whether tariff generate stagflationary pressures, i.e., coexistence of inflation and unemployment in the country imposing the tariff. More specifically, do stagflationary tendencies arise when a country imposes tariff on a vital intermediate input such as steel?
Many advanced economies, like the US, are net importers of steel. In addition, the steelconsuming industries constitute an integral part of these economies. As a result, a tariff-driven increase in domestic steel prices increases cost of production for steel-consuming industries which span a wide range of manufacturing sectors including fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment, and transportation equipment and parts (Francois and Baughman 2003) . Following a steel tariff-driven increased cost of production, steel-consuming industries can react to the increased cost in either or both of the two following ways. They can attempt to pass the increased steel costs to consumers by raising prices. To the extent that they succeed, price inflation will result. Steel-consuming industries can also attempt to minimize the increased steel costs by cutting back production. To the extent that they succeed, unemployment will result. Consequently, the combined effect of the tariff-driven steel price increase is to generate unemployment and inflationary tendencies in the economy imposing the tariff.
For the purpose of illustrating the tariff-driven stagflation hypothesis, we specify the following steel price function for a net-steel importing country:
where P denotes steel price in the country, C denotes the cost of steel production, Pm is the price of imported steel, and t is the steel tariff rate. Holding C constant, the relationship between P and t can be expressed as:
From [3] , taking the derivative of P with respect to t yields: 
indicating the tariff-driven increase in domestic steel price.
[5]
What is the impact of the tariff-driven steel price increase on inflation and unemployment? As noted earlier, the increase in steel price raises the cost of production of steel-consuming industries. Depending on the reaction of the steel-consuming industries, price inflation and/or unemployment will result. To delineate the effect of tariff-driven steel price increase on inflation, the following inflation function is specified:
where π is the average price level, P as before denotes steel price in the country, and Z is a set of control variables which may include real GDP, interest rate, wage rate, budget deficit, and energy prices. Abstracting from the variables in Z, [6] can be simplified as:
Assuming t directly affects P such that:
then combining [7] and [8] yields:
[8]
From [9] , taking the derivative of π with respect to t yields:
where ( ( )) measures the effect of changes in domestic steel price P on inflation π at tariff rate t, and ( ) measures the impact of changes in tariff rate t on domestic steel price P. Since t and P are positively related, then ( ( )) > 0 and ( ) > 0. Thus from [10]:
( ) > 0
[11] indicates tariff-induced inflation.
Similarly unemployment, u, in the economy can be represented as follows:
where P and Z are as defined before. Again, abstracting from the variables in Z, [12] can be rewritten as:
Assuming tariff directly affects domestic steel price, invoking [8] and combining it with [13] yields: [14] [10]
[11]
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From [14] , taking the derivative of u with respect to t yields:
where ℎ ( ( )) measures the effect of changes in domestic steel price P on unemployment u at tariff rate t, and ( ) measures the effect of changes in tariff rate t on domestic steel price P.
Here, while ( ) > 0, ℎ ( ( )) could be negative or positive depending on the net effect of the job-creation and job-shedding tendencies of the steel tariff. ℎ ( ( )) < 0 if job gains in steelproducing sector of the economy (due to steel tariff-driven increase in domestic steel price) outweighs job losses in steel-consuming sectors of the economy (due to steel tariff-induced increased cost of production). Conversely, ℎ ( ( )) > 0 if job losses in steel-consuming sectors of the economy outweighs job gains in the steel-producing sector. Since there is reason to believe the latter scenario to be the case in many advanced net-steel importing economies such as the US where steel-consuming sectors tend to be larger (in terms of output and employment) than the steel-producing sector, then ℎ ( ( )) > 0. Together with ( ) > 0, from [15] :
[16] indicates tariff-induced unemployment.
Equations [11] and [16] summarize the tariff-driven stagflation hypothesis. The next section discusses the empirical model to test the hypothesis.
Empirical model
To test the tariff-driven stagflation hypothesis, the study specifies the following structural VAR model:
+ where yt denotes a vector time series consisting of inflation rate (INFt), unemployment rate (UNEt), real GDP (GDPt), and tariff rate (TRFt). The vector εt consists of four structural shocks. The first three shocks correspond respectively to the inflation shock, unemployment shock, and output shock common in macroeconomic shocks literature (Barsky Basu Lee 2014; Bernanke Gertler Watson 1997; Burbige and Harrison 1984; Cochrane 1998; Evans 1989; Hamilton, 1983; Kilian 2009; Mountford and Uhlig 2009; Peersman and Van Robays 2009; Ramey 2016; Sims 1980; Uhlig 2005) . The study introduces a fourth shock referred to as tariff shock. This shock is associated with unexpected increases in tariff rates (here steel tariff rate).
To identify the shocks, the study uses the sign restrictions approach of Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) which allows the identification of shocks by directly restricting the signs of their impulse responses. Table 1 shows the sign restrictions for the shocks, each of which is discussed in turn. First, inflation shock is an unexpected increase in prices. We postulate that inflation shock will tend to raise prices and decrease the rate of unemployment (classic Philips [15] [16]
[17] 5 curve). However, the effect of this shock on output and steel tariff is unclear. Unexpected increase in prices could be associated with output growth or trigger output decline. Also, it is difficult to identify any automatic response of steel tariff rates following an inflation shock since steel tariff hikes could exacerbate the inflationary pressures. For these reasons, no restrictions are imposed on tariff and output responses to inflation shock. Instead, we let the data determine the signs of these responses. Second, unemployment shock is defined as unanticipated increase in unemployed labor and are assumed to be associated with high unemployment rate, low inflation rate, and output decline. The effect of this shock on tariff is unclear although it is likely to trigger calls for targeted tariff increase in the trade-related sectors of the economy. Consequently, no restriction is applied to tariff rate response to unemployment shock. Third, output shock is defined as unexpected increases in real output growth driven by economic expansion and are assumed to move inflation and unemployment in opposite directions. However, like inflation and unemployment shocks, the effect of this shock on tariff is not clear hence no restriction is imposed. Finally, tariff shock is defined as a sudden increase in tariff (here steel tariff) and is assumed to raise inflation and unemployment but may or may not increase real output. This shock is also characterized by a positive co-movement with the steel tariff rates. The price inflation that follows the tariff shock results from steel-consuming industries attempt to pass portions of the increased steel costs to the consumers by marginally raising prices, while the increase in unemployment arises from job-shedding attempts by the steel-consuming industries through production cut-backs. These set identifying restrictions imposed in Table 1 implies a unique response pattern for each structural shock. With this set of restrictions, the study operationalizes the empirical model using quarterly macroeconomic data on the US economy. 
Understanding the macroeconomic effects of steel tariffs on the US economy

Data
The study uses quarterly inflation rate, unemployment rate, real GDP growth, and steel tariff rate data from 1989-2017. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables. Inflation rate is the average quarterly percent change in the producer price index for all commodities and the consumer price index for all items. Unemployment rate is the quarterly civilian unemployment rate. Real GDP growth is the quarterly percent change in inflation adjusted value of goods and services. Data on producer price index, consumer price index, unemployment rate, and real GDP growth are obtained from the St. Louis Fed FRED website using the series PPIACO, CPIAUCNS, UNRATE, and GDPC1. Steel tariff rate data is obtained from the US International Trade 6 Commission (USITC) Harmonized Tariff Schedule publications. The starting date of the analysis is dictated by the availability of steel tariff rate data. The publication of the Basic Harmonized Tariff Schedule (BHTS) began in 1989. For most years, the BHTS is updated with supplementary and revision publications (referred to as supplements, for short). Where supplements available, attempt is made to compare the new presidential proclamation for modification of the tariff rates with previous rates. If the steel tariff rates from the basic publication and the supplements differ, the dates on the publications are used to match the rates with the respective quarter of the year. If the rates do not differ, the original schedule rates are maintained. On few occasions like 1990, only the supplementary publication is available. In that instance, the rates in the supplement is used. In the years missing both the BHTS publication and supplements, the immediately preceding year's rates is used. This applies to 1992. The tariff rates are in annual frequency and made up of three major categories: non-alloy steel, stainless steel, and other alloy steel. To obtain quarterly observations of steel tariff rates, the study used the average rate of the three categories in a given year for all four quarters of that year. Notes: Summary statistics based on quarterly averages for sample period 1989Q1-2017Q12. Inflation rate is the average quarterly percent change in the producer price index for all commodities and the consumer price index for all items. Unemployment is the quarterly civilian unemployment rate. Real GDP growth is the quarterly percent change in inflation adjusted value of the goods and services. Data on producer price index, consumer price index, unemployment rate, and real GDP growth are obtained from the St. Louis Fed FRED website using the series PPIACO, CPIAUCNS, UNRATE, and GDPC1. Steel tariff rate data is obtained from the US International Trade Commission (USITC) Harmonized Tariff Schedule publications and are in annual frequency and made up of three major categories, i.e., non-alloy steel, stainless steel, and other alloy steel. Quarterly steel tariff observations were derived by using the average rate of the three categories in a given year is for all four quarters of that year.
Empirical results
We estimate the structural VAR model in Eq.
[17] with the sign restrictions in Table 1 for the US economy using inflation, unemployment, real GDP, and steel tariff rate data for the sample period 1989Q1-2017Q4 and plot the estimated impulse responses. The lag length of two is used according to Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) and Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) criterion. In Section 4.2.1, we discuss the responses to inflation, unemployment, and output shocks. In Section 4.2.2, we discuss the responses to steel tariff shocks.
Effects of inflation, unemployment, and output shocks
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the estimated impulse responses of inflation rate, unemployment rate, real output, and steel tariff rate to inflation, unemployment, and output shocks, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. From Figure 1 , following an unanticipated increase in prices (positive inflation shock), real output and inflation increase while unemployment declines. The responses of inflation and unemployment is consistent with Philips curve where inflation and unemployment are inversely related. Also, the response of output is in line with the 7 view of rising prices with output expansion (Brock, 1974; Ireland 1994; Sidrauski 1967; Tobin 1965) . Steel tariff rate is not responsive to this shock. This is consistent with the restrictions discussion in Section 3 about the difficulty in identifying any automatic response of steel tariff policy following an inflation shock. Turning now to unemployment shock. As shown in Figure 2 , after an unanticipated increase in unemployment (positive unemployment shock), inflation and real output decline while unemployment rate spikes. The response of output to unemployment shock is in line with Okun's law and supported by empirical findings in Prachowny (1993) , Ball, Leigh, and Loungani (2013) , and Huang and Yeh (2013) although others empirical findings such as Lee (2000) , Freeman (2001) , and Malley and Molana (2008) point to mixed evidence about the inverse relationship between unemployment and output. Also, the inverse response of inflation to unemployment shock is consistent with Philips curve. Interestingly, this shock triggers a small increase in tariff rates which could reflect calls for targeted tariff increase in the trade-related sectors of the economy, such as the steel sector, following periods of rising unemployment.
Regarding output shock, as Figure 3 shows, after periods of unexpected economic expansion (positive output shock), real output increases, inflation rises, and unemployment decreases. However, steel tariff rate is not responsive to this shock which is not surprising as there is no hard-fast rule about trade policy during periods of economic expansion. If any, during good economic times one would expect calls for protectionist trade policy to be rare or on the sidelines, hence no major trade policy shift is likely to take place during periods of unexpected economic expansion. Figure 4 shows the estimated impulse responses of inflation, unemployment, output, and steel tariff rate to steel tariff shocks, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The main results are the following. A positive steel tariff shock triggers an increase in steel tariff rate, a rise in inflation, an increase in unemployment, and a decline in real output. The responses of inflation and unemployment to the steel tariff shock are consistent with the steel tariff-driven stagflation hypothesis. Since steel-consuming industries constitute an integral part of US economy, the price inflation that follows the steel tariff shock could result from steel-consuming industries attempting to pass the increased steel costs to the consumers. The extent to which they succeed can be inferred from the short-run price elasticity of demand for consumer goods.
Effects of tariff shocks
Impulse response for inflation Impulse response for unemployment Impulse response for real GDP Impulse response for steel tariff
Quarters after shock Quarters after shock Quarters after shock Quarters after shock Notes: The solid blue lines are the median impulse responses to a positive steel tariff shock estimated using the sign-restriction structural VAR approach. That is, the responses of inflation and unemployment have been restricted to positive and response of steel tariff rate restricted to negative. No restriction is placed on the response of real output. The top row shows the responses of inflation and unemployment. The bottom row shows the responses of output and steel tariff rate. The dotted red lines are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands.
To determine the economy-wide short-run price elasticity of demand for consumer goods, we estimated an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model with personal consumption expenditures as dependent variable and consumer price index and real disposable personal income as explanatory variables. We found a price elasticity of -0.903 indicating that, the shortrun demand for consumer goods is inelastic which in turn suggests that steel-consuming industries have a small but a possible window of passing some of its costs to consumers. A price elasticity of -1 or higher would have ruled out this possibility. 2 Our finding that tariff shock triggers a rise in inflation is in line with Rassekh and Ranjbar (2014) but contrasts Batra (2003) . Rassekh and Ranjbar (2014) find that, in OECD countries, factors -such as exchange rate fluctuations and movements in tariff rates -that influence import prices tend to be inflationary while Batra (2003) finds that tariffs produce inflation only in nonmarket or dualistic developing economies, but not in advanced economies like the US. These studies however examined the effects of tariffs in general not steel tariff in particular as in this study.
In the case of unemployment, the increase that follows a tariff shock could reflect jobshedding by the steel-consuming industries as they attempt to minimize the increased steel costs by cutting back production. To examine the short-run effect of steel tariff rate changes on steelconsuming industries employment, we estimate an ARDL model that includes a measure of employment in steel-consuming industries as dependent variables and steel tariff rate, steel price index, and effective federal funds rate as explanatory variables. We found that, a 1 percentage point increase in steel tariff rate yields a 0.015% drop in employment in steelconsuming industries. 3 While a growing literature on the relationship between trade and unemployment suggest that in the short-run, openness raises unemployment (Davidson and Matusz 2004; Egger and Kreickemeier 2009; Janiak 2006; Mitra and Ranjan 2007; Trefler 2004; Yanikkaya 2013 ; among others), our finding suggest that unemployment can also result from protectionist trade policies.
Finally, since we did not impose any sign restriction on real output response to tariff shock, the real output decline following steel tariff shock could result from the combined effects of rising unemployment and inflation as stagflationary periods tend to coincide with output decline (Barsky and Kilian 2002; Blinder and Rudd 2008; Bruno and Sachs 1985; Kendrick 1981; Kilian 2010; Olson 1982; Peterson 1980 ).
Robustness checks
The study checked the results for robustness to changes in the lag length, to the exclusion of constant terms in the VAR, and to changes in the order in which the shocks are established. 4 We found that the main results of the paper, that steel tariff shocks trigger an increase in steel tariff rate, a rise in inflation, an increase in unemployment, and a decline in real output are invariant to these changes. However, some things do change across specifications in changing the lag length, in particular, the behavior of the response of inflation to steel tariff shock. For lags 3, as in the main estimated model with two lags, after an immediate increase in inflation rate following steel tariff shock, the rate does not increase beyond 0.05% six quarters into the shock, but for lags 5 and 6 it does.
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Conclusion
This paper investigates another potential source of stagflation focusing on import tariffs. A tariffdriven stagflation hypothesis is presented. The structural VAR identification approach with sign restrictions is utilized to test the hypothesis using quarterly data on the US economy from 1989-2017. Results indicate that tariff shocks on vital intermediate input, such as steel, trigger shortrun stagflationary tendencies as characterized by increase inflation and unemployment and decline in real output. More generally, the analysis presented in this paper suggest that tariff shocks on net-imported vital intermediate input generate short-run macroeconomic instability.
Notes
1 Other studies that emphasize the oil shocks channel to stagflation include Cologni and Manera 2008 , Dogrul and Soytas 2010 , Jimnez-Rodrguez and Sanchez 2005 , Sachs 1982 , and Santini 1985 The ARDL model is estimated using quarterly personal consumption expenditures, consumer price index for all items, and real disposable personal income data from 1989-2017. Personal consumption expenditures data is obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income Accounts. Consumer price index and real disposable personal income data are retrieved from the St. Louis Fed FRED website, using the series CPIAUCNS and A229RX0. The model has personal consumption expenditures (in units) as dependent variable and consumer price index and real disposable personal income as explanatory variables. The explanatory variables respectively capture the price and income elasticities. We found a short-run price elasticity of -0.903 and income elasticity of 0.29 using the Akaike info criterion (AIC) and Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC) lag selection criteria. The Schwarz criterion (SIC) yielded an income elasticity of 0.38 and a statistically insignificant price elasticity. Cointegration is found among variables in all estimated models. Results are summarized in Table A1 in the Appendix. The ARDL modeling approach has become increasingly popular in estimating elasticities due to the new approach developed by Shin (1999) and Smith (2001) . The model is a general dynamic specification which uses the lags of the dependent variable and the lagged and contemporaneous values of the explanatory variable through which the short-run effects can be directly estimated (Gosh 2009, Pesaran Shin and Smith 2001; von Arnim and Prabheesh 2013) . 3 The reported short-run elasticity of steel-consuming industries employment to steel tariff rate changes of -0.015 is based on the results from the AIC lag selection criterion. The HQC and SIC lag selection criteria yielded elasticity of -0.022 and -0.035 respectively. The models are estimated using quarterly data from 1990-2017. Results are summarized in Table A2 in the Appendix. Steel consuming industries employment data is obtained from the BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) database. Our definition of steel-consuming industries includes NAICS 2362, 237, 238, 32411, 325, 326211, 332, 333, 335 , and 336 (Nonresidential building construction, Heavy and civil engineering construction, Specialty trade contractors, Petroleum refineries, Chemical manufacturing, Tire manufacturing except retreading, Fabricated metal product manufacturing, Industrial machinery manufacturing, Electrical equipment and appliance manufacturing, and Transportation equipment manufacturing). Steel tariff rate data is obtained from the US International Trade Commission Basic Harmonized Tariff Schedule publications. Data on steel price index (average of cold rolled sheet PPI and hot rolled steel PPI) is retrieved from the St. Louis FRED database using series WPU101707 and WPU101703. Effective federal funds data is also retrieved from FRED database using series FEDFUNDS. 4 We re-estimated the VAR model with lag lengths 3, 5, and 6, without constant terms, and by changing the ordering of the variables to identify the shocks. The models are estimated using quarterly data from 1989-2017. * denotes 5% level of significance. Cointegration is found among variables in all three models. Adjusted R 2 : AIC ARDL(4,2,2) = 0.28; HQC ARDL(4,2,2) = 0.33; SIC ARDL(4,2,2) = 0.16 Durbin-Watson statistic: AIC ARDL(4,2,2) = 2.04; HQC ARDL(4,2,2) = 2.04; SIC ARDL(4,2,2) = 2.03 Notes: SCIE denotes steel-consuming industries employment, STR is steel tariff rate, SPI is steel price index, and EFFR is effective federal funds rate. Akaike info criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC), and Schwarz criterion (SIC) are the lag selection criteria. Elasticity estimates based on Error Correction Model regression. The models are estimated using quarterly data from 1990-2017. * denotes 5% level of significance. Cointegration is found among variables in all three models. Adjusted R 2 : AIC ARDL(3,2,2,4) = 0.47; HQC ARDL(3,2,1,4) = 0.46; SIC ARDL(3,2,1,0) = 0.39 Durbin-Watson statistic: AIC ARDL(3,2,2,4) = 2.27; HQC ARDL(3,2,1,4) = 2.35; SIC ARDL(3,2,1,0) = 2.11
